We develop a reciprocity-based model of wage determination and incorporate it into a modern dynamic general equilibrium framework. We estimate the model and …nd that, among potential determinants of wage policy, rent-sharing (between workers and …rms) and a measure of wage entitlement are critical to …t the dynamic responses of hours, wages and in ‡ation to various exogenous shocks. Aggregate employment conditions (measuring workers' outside option), on the other hand, are found to play only a negligible role in wage setting. These results are broadly consistent with micro-studies on reciprocity in labor relations but contrast with traditional e¢ ciency wage models which emphasize aggregate labor market variables as the main determinant of wage setting. Overall, the empirical …t of the estimated model is at least as good as the …t of models postulating nominal wage contracts. In particular, the reciprocity model is more successful in generating the sharp and signi…cant fall of in ‡ation and nominal wage growth in response to a neutral technology shock.
Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models postulating nominal price and wage rigidities replicate surprisingly well key business cycle properties. They are, for that reason, increasingly used for monetary policy analysis. Recent studies documenting the performance of these models include Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Lindé (2004, ACEL henceforth) and Wouters (2003, 2007) . These studies uniformly conclude that assuming rigid nominal wages is critical for the models'performance.
As Barro (1977) and Hall (1980) observed some time ago, however, the allocative role of wage contracts typically implies large ine¢ ciencies in such models as workers are repeatedly pushed o¤ their labor supply schedule. Given the continuing nature of interactions between workers and …rms, these ine¢ ciencies are hard to rationalize. Unsurprisingly, all the above studies thus conclude that a deeper understanding of the mechanics behind the observed sluggishness of wages needs to be developed.
In the present paper, we propose a structural model of wage determination based on reciprocity in labor relations. Wages are allocative but since both workers'and the …rms'postulated optimality conditions hold in equilibrium, the model is not subject to the Barro-Hall critique. We incorporate the model into a modern DSGE framework and estimate the structural parameters. The obtained estimates are in line with survey evidence on reciprocity in labor relations. In addition the model matches the empirical response of macro aggregates to various exogenous shocks at least as well as an equivalent model postulating nominal wage contracts.
Section 3 describes the model. In line with e¢ ciency wage theory, e¤ort per hour worked is unobservable and thus cannot be contracted upon. The central hypothesis is that workers may derive a psychological bene…t from reciprocating a generous wage o¤er by the …rm with harder work, even though providing e¤ort per se is costly and there are no explicit incentives for doing so.
If this reciprocity motive is present, …rms set wages so as to elicit a pro…t maximizing level of e¤ort.
In the absence of a reciprocity motive, the model collapses to the standard indivisible labor model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) .
Inspired by Rabin's (1993) introduction of fairness into game theory and building on our previous adaptation of this concept for macroeconomics (Danthine and Kurmann, 2007) , we explicitly model the psychological bene…t derived from reciprocity as the product of the worker's gift to the …rm in terms of e¤ort and the …rm's gift to the worker in terms of remuneration. The latter is measured as the di¤erence between the utility resulting from the actual wage o¤er and the utility obtained under a reference compensation level. Building on the results of micro studies reviewed in Section 2, we let this reference compensation level depend on three potential factors: the worker's outside option described by external labor market conditions; a measure of …rm-internal labor productivity representative of rent-sharing considerations; and past wages capturing the notion of wage entitlement on the part of workers.
Section 4 analyzes the theoretical implications of the model. We …nd that balanced growth imposes important restrictions. In particular, the worker's reciprocity motive must always be positive for equilibrium employment to be positive; moreover the weights on external wage conditions, rent-sharing and wage entitlement in the worker's reference wage must sum up to one for the labor share to remain bounded. These restrictions imply that our reciprocity-based construct has only two free parameters, a fact that imposes considerable discipline on the estimation. Section 5 estimates the structural parameters of the model in a modern DSGE framework featuring sticky prices, external habit persistence in consumption, variable capital utilization and investment adjustment cost. We do not impose any prior on the relative importance of the three factors in the reference compensation level. Our strategy consists instead of estimating their empirical relevance as part of the DSGE model subject to the balanced growth restrictions. Aside from the reciprocity-based wage setting block, the DSGE framework closely resembles the one proposed by ACEL (2004). Since we use the same estimation strategy as these authors as well as their data, we can directly compare the empirical performance of their model with ours. The estimation strategy consists of minimizing the distance between the model-based impulse response of macro aggregates to three identi…ed shocks with their empirical counterparts computed from a vector autoregression (VAR). The three identi…ed shocks are a neutral technology shock, an investment speci…c technology shock and a monetary policy shock. The VAR is composed of 10 post-war quarterly U.S. time series of prominent macroeconomic aggregates.
For our model to replicate the conditional VAR dynamics, the estimation attributes substantial importance to wage entitlement while also giving signi…cant weight to rent-sharing. By contrast, external labor market conditions are estimated to matter only marginally in the construction of the reference wage. This is largely consistent with survey evidence on reciprocity in labor relations, which …nd that rent-sharing and wage entitlement are important factors in the workers' fairness evaluation whereas external employment conditions matter much less because workers often know too little about them. Section 6, …nally, contrasts the reciprocity model to a DSGE model with sticky prices and nominal wage contracts (both introduced via a Calvo (1983) mechanism) that has, in many ways, become the standard for monetary policy analysis. Overall, the empirical …t of the reciprocity model is comparable to the performance of the nominal wage contracts model. The reciprocity model is more successful, however, in generating the sharp drop on impact in in ‡ation and nominal wage growth following a neutral technology shock, a reaction that emerges as a robust stylized fact from several VAR studies. By contrast, real wages in the data adjust sluggishly irrespective of the shock.
The available evidence thus tends to favor real wage rigidity (as generated by our reciprocity model) over unconditional nominal wage rigidity (as implied by nominal wage contracts models).
Related Literature
The reciprocity hypothesis receives strong support from a large number of survey studies bearing on labor relations (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986 ; or Bewley, 1999) as well as from laboratory experiments in behavioral economics (e.g., Fehr and Falk, 1999) . Both strands of literature also document that …rms often refrain from o¤ering explicit rewards for e¤ort because enforcing such mechanisms is costly and may negatively a¤ect work morale. 1 Reciprocity in labor relations was introduced into macroeconomics by Akerlof (1982) under the name of 'partial gift exchange'and 'fair wage hypothesis'. As in more conventional e¢ ciency wage formulations such as Salop's (1979) labor turnover theory or Shapiro and Stiglitz'(1984) shirking model, both rent-sharing and wage entitlement are absent from Akerlof 's model. Instead, the reference compensation level depends entirely on the worker's expected earnings outside of the …rm.
This focus on …rm-external wage references contrasts strongly with the available micro evidence.
In many situations, workers appear to have only little reliable information about their own pro-1 See Fehr and Gaechter (1999) and Bewley (2002) for an extensive discussion of the empirical evidence. The appendix of Danthine and Kurmann (2007) In contrast with these studies, our investigation explicitly focuses on the ability of our model to …t the distinct dynamics of labor market and in ‡ation variables in response to various exogenous
shocks. In addition, we set our model in a stochastic growth context, which turns out to imply important parameter restrictions; and we formalize the reciprocity motive at the level of individuals' preferences rather than as a reduced-form equation. To our knowledge, Rotemberg (2007) is the 2 This combination, however, implies non-trivial heterogeneity across …rms that their model fails to take into account.
only other study that explicitly introduces non-pecuniary considerations in labor relations into a dynamic general equilibrium context. His model and empirical strategy are quite di¤erent, however, providing an interesting alternative perspective to the present attempt.
Our paper also relates to recent studies by Hall (2005) , Shimer (2005) and Krause and Lubik (2007) who assess the empirical performance of DSGE models with job search in the labor market.
They conclude that the standard search model where wages are determined by Nash bargaining fails to generate quantitatively important responses to plausible exogenous technology shocks. By contrast, the labor search model becomes more successful if wages are constrained to be a function of past wages. The wage entitlement dimension of our reciprocity-based model o¤ers an explicit rationale for this dependence on past wages.
The Model
Our model is based on the now standard New Keynesian business cycle framework with nominal price rigidities as described in Goodfriend and King (1998) Calvo (1983) .
In line with e¢ ciency wage theory, we assume that e¤ort per unit of labor is an input to production in the intermediate goods sector but it cannot be directly observed. In contrast to labor hours, e¤ort is therefore not directly contractible. Firms understand, however, that while workers dislike e¤ort per se, they may derive utility from reciprocating a generous wage o¤er with a commensurate e¤ort level even in the absence of monitoring.
Individuals and households
There is a [0 1] continuum of identical individuals spread across a [0 1] continuum of identical households. In each household, some of the individuals are working while others are unemployed.
An individual's momentary utility is given by
where C t stands for current consumption, C t 1 is the previous period (average) per capita consumption, b 0 is an external habit parameter, 1 is the total number of hours available per individual, L t is the fraction of hours worked, and E t E n is the deviation of e¤ort per hour worked from some norm level E n assumed to be constant over time. The term s(E t ; ) admits that workers may derive utility from reciprocal behavior towards their employer, with the parameter determining the relative importance of such considerations. 4 Anticipating our discussion on optimal behavior in the next section, we note that there is no reciprocity motive when = 0, in which case workers supply E t = E n units of e¤ort per hour. When > 0, by contrast, workers may be willing -under circumstances described below -to reward (punish) a wage o¤er perceived as generous (unfair) with e¤ort in excess of (below) E n even though no direct material gain derives from such action. The optimality condition that guides this decision is
We call this equation the E¤ort Condition (EC).
Following Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985) , labor is assumed to be indivisible in the sense that individuals would ideally like to supply L t but that they have to choose between working a …xed shift H > L t or not working at all. In such a situation, the household can make its members better o¤ by providing a lottery whereby a fraction N t of individuals work a fraction H hours with consumption C t (1) while the remaining 1 N t individuals remain unemployed with consumption C t (2). In order to avoid heterogeneity, we assume that households hold all assets, make all investment decisions and redistribute income net of investment to their members. In each period, they collect their workers' labor income, rental payments on capital owned by the family, and dividends from a perfectly diversi…ed portfolio of claims to …rms. They then decide on investment in new physical capital, I t , and redistribute the rest to their members for consumption.
For the type of separable preferences assumed here, e¢ cient risk sharing implies an identical level of consumption for employed and unemployed individuals alike; i.e. C t (1) = C t (2) = C t . 5 Omitting household indices to simplify notation, we can therefore formulate the household's intertemporal optimization problem as max fCt;It;K t+1; Nt;Etg
subject to
where E 0 is the expectations operator given information at time 0, K t stands for the physical capital stock available at the beginning of period t; (U t ) is the rate of capital depreciation, which depends on the level of utilization U t , with 0 > 0, 00 > 0; W t denotes the real wage; R K t is the rental rate of capital; and D t are dividends paid out on a diversi…ed portfolio of …rm shares. Following King and Rebelo (2000), we place the capital utilization decision directly with the …rms, which face a trade-o¤ between higher e¤ective capital use and higher depreciation. This trade-o¤ is re ‡ected in higher rental costs associated with more intensive capital use; i.e., R K t = [r t 1 + (U t )]=V t where r t is the real gross return on a risk-free one-period bond. Following Fisher (2006) , new investment I t translates into installed capital through V t F (I t ; I t 1 ), where V t is an exogenous investment-speci…c technology shock whose growth rate V;t V t =V t 1 evolves according to
As in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and ACEL (2004), we specify
where S is an arbitrary function satisfying S( I SS ) = S 0 ( I SS ) = 0 and S 00 = > 0.
Reciprocity
To formalize reciprocity, we follow the approach of Rabin (1993) as adapted to a modern macroeconomic setting by Danthine and Kurmann (2007 In de…ning d(E t (i); ) and g(W t (i); ), we follow Rabin one more step and measure the gifts as the deviation of e¤ort and wages, respectively, from some reference level. For d(E t (i); ), the e¤ort reference is, quite naturally, the norm e¤ort level E n . We thus specify
with f 0 > 0 and f 00 0: The only important restriction in this speci…cation is that E t (i) enters additively with respect to any other (omitted) determinant. This assumption is not as innocuous as it may seem. Rabin assumes, for example, that the worker's gift is measured in terms of its impact on the …rm; i.e., output per worker Y (E t (i); )=N t (i), an assumption that violates the above restriction. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider Rabin's speci…cation as an alternative but note already that since output per worker is growing over time while e¤ort is bounded above and below, we need to normalize this measure by some trend productivity level. Hence, Rabin's alternative speci…cation of the worker's gift in our context takes the form
where Y (E t (i); )=N t (i) is …rm i's labor productivity and X t the relevant trend productivity level (to be de…ned later).
The de…nition of the wage reference is more critical in the speci…cation of …rm i's gift to its workers because the level g(W t (i); ) matters for the optimal e¤ort decision. As reported in Section 2, various hypotheses have been entertained on this point. Our strategy is to adopt an encompassing and ‡exible speci…cation with the goal of letting the data speak. We thus de…ne
The …rst term, log[(1
, is the utility from consumption that a worker at …rm i obtains under the actual wage o¤er. The variable t (i) in this expression denotes the state-contingent tax rate that the household applies to the revenue of workers at …rm i so as to implement optimal risk sharing across household members. The remaining terms in g(W t (i); ) de…ne a weighted sum of utility levels that would obtain for di¤erent reference compensation points. In particular, the term
describes the utility obtained if the …rm distributed its entire revenue to its workers and thus proxies for the …rm's ability to pay. The term log[(1 t (i)) W t N t ] measures the worker's outside option; i.e., the utility from the remuneration the worker expects to obtain if she were to refuse the actual wage o¤er and leave the …rm. Finally, the term log[(1 t (i))W t 1 captures the utility level obtained if the salary were to stay at last period's level. 6 
Firms
Final goods …rms produce a composite good Y t by combining a continuum of intermediate goods
where p > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. Let P t (i) be the price of intermediate good i and P t the price of the …nal good sold to consumers in a perfectly 6 By formulating this last part in terms of W t 1 rather than W t 1 (i), we implicitly assume that …rms do not internalize the e¤ect of workers'past wages into their wage decision. This assumption corresponds to a high-mobility economy where workers change …rms frequently.
competitive market. The objective of the …nal goods …rm is to choose Y t (i) in order to minimize 
where t 1 P t 1 =P t 2 denotes last period's aggregate in ‡ation, and denotes average in ‡ation.
The probability p is constant through time and independent of …rms'individual pricing history.
The case ! = 1 corresponds to ACEL's speci…cation for which there is full indexation of prices to past in ‡ation. For ! = 0, non-optimizing …rms simply adjust their price according to the average in ‡ation rate.
Given the price P t (i), …rm i is assumed to satisfy the quantity demanded, which it produces with technology
with 0 < < 1, and where A t denotes an exogenous neutral technology shock common to all …rms.
The growth rate A;t A t =A t 1 evolves according to
E¤ort E t (i) cannot be observed directly by the …rm. However, …rms understand that workers provide e¤ort according to the e¤ort condition laid out in (1). Furthermore, the …rm knows that households let their members participate in the labor market only if the wage exceeds the total marginal disutility from working. The intermediate goods …rm's problem therefore consists of setting prices P t (i) and real wages W t (i), hiring labor N t (i), renting capital K t (i) and deciding on capital utilization u t (i) in order to maximize the present value of current and expected future real
subject to the …nal goods …rm's demand, the …rm's price adjustment restrictions, the worker's e¤ort condition and the household's participation constraint. Since …rms are assumed to pay out their net proceeds in the form of dividends to households at the end of each period, future pro…ts are discounted at j t+j , with t+j denoting the marginal utility of the household's average consumption level.
Monetary policy
We close the model with the assumption that monetary policy follows an exogenous money growth rule of the form
Here, M t denote nominal balances; " M ;t represents the shock to monetary policy; and A , V allow for accommodation of the two real shocks. While the two technology shocks occur at the beginning of the period prior to the private agents'optimal decisions, the monetary shock is assumed to occur at the end of the period after decisions have been taken. This timing assumption ensures that the model is consistent with the identifying restrictions of the empirical monetary shock described in the empirical part of the paper.
Money demand, in turn, is summarized by a reduced-form process, as in King and Watson (1996) or Dotsey and King (2002):
where R t is the average quarterly gross nominal interest rate on a riskless bond, and & is the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. 7 Our characterization of monetary policy and money demand is similar to the speci…cation in ACEL (2004), except that their monetary shock process allows for more degrees of freedom and that they adopt an explicit transaction cost framework where …rms need to borrow their wage bill in advance.
Aggregation and general equilibrium
The Calvo price setting mechanism adopted here implies that the distribution of intermediate goods prices and output levels is in…nite at each point in time. As Yun (1996) shows, however, assuming a constant-returns-to-scale technology and economy-wide homogenous factor markets implies that all …rms face the same real marginal cost independently of their output level. Consequently, the price distribution is fully summarized by the price level uniformly selected by all reoptimizing …rms and the average price charged by non-optimizing …rms, which is simply last period's aggregate price times the adjustment factor (8)).
At …rst sight, our model su¤ers from further heterogeneity problems because an intermediate …rm's wage W t (i), and thus the e¤ort of its employees E t (i), not only depend on aggregate variables but also on the …rm-speci…c labor productivity Y t (i)=N t (i), which in turn depends on the demand for the …rm's product and thus on its price P t (i). The following proposition, however, establishes that a variant of Yun's (1996) aggregation results applies:
Under the assumptions of constant-returns-to-scale technology and frictionless physical capital markets, intermediate goods …rms …nd it optimal to produce at the same e¤ective capital labor ratio. Hence, they set identical wages and, when allowed to optimize, select identical prices independently of their pricing history.
Proof. See the appendix. Y t =N t . Furthermore, we have
is an auxiliary aggregate price index, and
Combining this last equation with the representative household's budget constraint, we obtain the familiar national income account equation
The general equilibrium dynamics of our model is thus described by the system of equations made up of the e¤ort condition (1), the optimality conditions for the household's problem (2) with respect to C t , I t , K t+1 and N t , the aggregate version of the production function (9), the optimality conditions for the intermediate goods …rms' problem (11) with respect to P t (the homogenous optimal price in case of adjustment), N t , W t , K t , U t , the de…nition of the aggregate price index
, the money growth rule (12), money demand (13) and the national income account equation (14) .
The quantitative results discussed in Section 5 come from log-linearizing the system of equations just described around the non-stochastic steady states of the di¤erent variables after normalizing and solving for the rational expectations equilibrium with the numerical algorithm developed by
King and Watson (1998). 9 
Model implications: a stylized case
Before moving to the quantitative evaluation of the model, we analyze a stylized version that abstracts from physical capital. We …rst study the labor market properties of our economy. We then detail the business cycle implications of rent-sharing and wage entitlement.
Labor market properties
Without physical capital, the intermediate …rm's production reduces to Y t = A t (E t N t ) , (we omit …rm indices i to economize on notation). The worker's gift to the …rm is
9 See the appendix for details. We thank Bob King for providing us with the solution code.
For v = 0, this expression corresponds to de…nition (4); for v = 1, to (5). 10 With this de…nition and the (unchanged) de…nition of the …rm's gift (6), the e¤ort condition (1) becomes
where we isolated the state-contingent tax part for convenience.
The intermediate goods …rms' problem in this stylized environment reduces to selecting their price when possible, and deciding on employment and wages so as to minimize labor costs W t N t while satisfying the demand for their product Y t (A t E t N t ) given the workers'e¤ort condition (15) . 11 The necessary …rst-order conditions are
where t denotes real marginal cost, or the inverse of the markup charged by the monopolistic …rm.
Equation (16) describes labor demand. The term @E t =@N t N t =E t > 0 takes into account the fact that higher employment decreases labor productivity, thereby increasing the …rm's gift and thus e¤ort (ceteris paribus). At a given wage, this leads …rms to overhire in comparison to their optimal hiring level in a standard case where this e¤ect is absent. Equation (17) can be combined with (16) to yield
Danthine and Kurmann (2007) refer to this equation as the Modi…ed Solow Condition (MSC). For @E t =@N t N t =E t = 0, the MSC would reduce to Solow's (1979) original condition, which says that at the optimal wage rate, the marginal cost of an e¤ective unit of work equals its average cost. But for @E t =@N t N t =E t > 0, Solow's condition no longer applies because a marginal wage increase has an additional positive e¤ect on labor productivity, which in turn decreases the …rm's gift and thus e¤ort.
Using the implicit function theorem, the MSC can be made explicit as (see appendix for the derivation)
This expression describes the e¤ort level optimally induced by the …rm through its wage policy. It leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. (i) For v = 0, the …rm's optimal wage policy is such that e¤ort is constant; (ii)
for v > 0, the …rm's optimal wage policy is such that e¤ort is variable.
The only potentially time-varying element in that expression is E t , which means that E t = E at all times.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (16) and combining the resulting equation with the above MSC, we obtain an explicit expression for labor demand
Note that for the constant e¤ort case (v = 0), this equation is equivalent to a standard labor demand up to a constant 1=(1 (1 )' 1 ) > 1. The constant subsumes the overhiring tendency discussed above.
We can furthermore combine the MSC (19) with the e¤ort condition (15) to obtain an explicit expression for the …rm's optimal wage
This equation replaces the labor supply schedule of standard competitive models of the labor market.
For ' 1 > 0, the optimal wage increases with the …rm's revenue per worker, a notion that we associate with rent-sharing. For ' 2 > 0, the optimal wage increases with the aggregate wage and employment level, two measures that capture external labor market conditions. For ' 3 > 0, the optimal wage depends positively on the individual's past real wage, a dependence that can be linked to the notion of wage entitlement.
The wage setting equation (21) implies important parameter restrictions for an environment with stochastic growth such as ours. In particular, real wages and labor productivity both increase over time whereas e¤ort and the labor share W t N t =Y t are stationary by de…nition. The following proposition ensures that these conditions are met:
Proposition 3. Stationarity of e¤ort and the labor share W t N t =Y t along the balanced growth path
Proof. See the appendix. Proof. See the appendix.
This result is interesting because it says that independently of the parametrization of the gifts of the worker and the …rm, the equilibrium of our model is always consistent with positive reciprocity, > 0. 13 Note that all the stated propositions remain valid for the full model of the previous section, that is, in the presence of physical capital, variable utilization and investment adjustment cost.
Business cycle implications of rent-sharing and wage entitlement
In order to get a sense of the role of rent-sharing and wage entitlement considerations over the business cycle, we express the various equations of our stylized model in loglinear terms and focus on the constant e¤ort case (v = 0). Ignoring constants, aggregate production, labor demand and optimal wage setting become, respectively,
Lower-case variables denote logarithms from now on. Imposing the balanced growth restriction from Proposition 3, we obtain, after some rearrangement, the following equations for real wages and the real marginal cost
Despite their partial equilibrium character (w t and t both depend on n t and past endogenous variables), these two equations reveal interesting properties of our model. In particular, all right- Let us analyze the import of rent-sharing considerations. Equation (22) tells us that the more workers'e¤ort depends on the …rm's ability to pay (' 1 > 0), the stronger is the direct impact of technology shocks a t on the optimal wage, and the smaller is the wage response to ‡uctuations in hours worked n t . Rent-sharing thus has an ambiguous general equilibrium e¤ect on the response of wages to technology shocks. If, ceteris paribus, the equilibrium response of hours worked to technology shocks is large, rent-sharing reduces the wage response. If, instead, hours worked react little or even inversely to technology shocks, rent-sharing increases the wage response to these shocks. Figure 1a illustrates these e¤ects by contrasting a labor market with rent sharing (solid wage setting curve) with a labor market without rent sharing (dotted wage setting curve). Suppose that before the technology shock, both economies are in the same equilibrium (point E). If, as depicted, the labor demand curve shifts out relatively little in response to a technology change a t > 0, then the real wage adjusts more in the rent-sharing economy (point E'vs. point E").
14 To see this, divide both numerator and denominator of each right-hand-side term by ' 3 . The only terms that remain are the fractions ' 1 =' 3 and ' 2 =' 3 .
By contrast, rent-sharing unambiguous dampens the reaction of wages to non-technology shocks because, in this case, a t does not change. In fact, if rent-sharing is su¢ ciently important relative to external labor market considerations (i.e., if ' 2 (1 )' 1 < 0), then wages and employment move in opposite directions. Figure 1b depicts such a situation for a shock that only shifts out the labor demand.
The impact of rent-sharing considerations on the real marginal cost in response to a neutral technology shock are equally ambiguous. The stronger the rent-sharing forces, the smaller the response of real marginal cost to technology shocks and the changes in hours worked. But because technology a t and employment have opposite e¤ects on real marginal cost, the overall response depends on the general equilibrium elasticity of employment to technology shocks. Rent-sharing thus also has an ambiguous e¤ect on in ‡ation dynamics. To understand this, note that our pricing restrictions imply a loglinear equation of the form (again ignoring constants) 
The smaller the response of current and future expected real marginal costs to ‡uctuations in technology and other variables, the smoother the dynamics of in ‡ation.
Let us now consider the e¤ects of external employment conditions. Equations (22) and (23) tell us that the more workers take into account aggregate employment conditions (' 2 > 0), the more sensitive real wages and real marginal cost become to movements in employment. As in a Walrasian labor market with an inelastic labor supply, shocks have smaller quantity and larger price e¤ects, that is, they translate into larger changes in real wages and in ‡ation.
Finally, consider the e¤ects of wage entitlement. Equation (22) indicates that the more past wages in ‡uence worker's e¤ort and thus the …rm's wage decision (' 3 > 0), the smaller are the e¤ects of movements in technology and employment and the larger is the persistence of wage movements.
According to equation (23) , wage entitlement also unambiguously increases the contemporaneous reaction of real marginal cost to technology and employment ‡uctuations.
In sum, the stylized case illustrates that rent-sharing and wage entitlement have intricate implications for wages, employment and in ‡ation dynamics. It appears, in particular, that, if these considerations are relevant, real wages and in ‡ation may display very di¤erent reactions depending on the nature of the shocks.
Empirical evaluation
We now move beyond partial equilibrium and proceed with a quantitative evaluation of the full DSGE model described in Section 3. In a …rst step, we estimate the model using the impulse response estimator applied by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) 
Estimation approach
The implied by the model and their empirical counterparts. We adopt this limited information estimator rather than a full-information likelihood-based estimator for two reasons. First, our focus is on the dynamics of a small set of variables in response to speci…c shocks. Second, for the sake of comparability, we strive to remain as close as possible to recent studies analyzing the empirical performance of New Keynesian DSGE models with nominal wage rigidities. In particular, we employ exactly the same VAR speci…cation, shock identi…cation and dataset as ACEL (2004). 15 Since ACEL (2004) provide a detailed description of their estimator and the data, we restrict ourselves to a brief summary. ACEL's VAR is based on a 10-dimensional data vector containing stationary combinations of di¤erent macro aggregates. 16 ACEL then identify a monetary policy 15 We thank Larry Christiano for generously making the entire ACEL Matlab code, data and appendix available on his website. 16 The variables used in the VAR are: (1) the change in the relative price of investment; (2) labor productivity growth; (3) GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation; (4) capacity utilization; (5) total hours; (6) labor income share; (7) The monetary policy shock has no contemporaneous e¤ect on any of the macro aggregates but the federal funds rate, money growth and velocity.
The neutral technology shock and the investment-speci…c technology shock are the only shocks that may have a permanent e¤ect on labor productivity.
The investment-speci…c technology shock is the only disturbance that may have a permanent e¤ect on the relative price of investment.
Since the timing and statistical properties of the shock processes in our model satisfy all these 
where is a diagonal matrix with the sample variances of^ along the diagonal. hours, real wages, in ‡ation and nominal wage growth, to a one standard deviation change in each of the three identi…ed shocks. The thin solid lines are the point estimates of the SVAR, with the surrounding grey areas representing the 95% con…dence intervals. 18 The circled lines pertain to the IRFs of the estimated model and are discussed afterwards.
As ACEL (2004) in ‡ation display a hump-shaped response, with in ‡ation displaying substantially more persistence than the real variables. 19 Real wages, by contrast, hardly move. The insigni…cant procyclical or even countercyclical response of real wages is con…rmed by other structural VAR studies on the e¤ects of non-permanent shocks (that do not necessarily need to be monetary shocks). 20 For the neutral technology shock, the following observation stand out: (i) output jumps on impact and then gradually increases to its new permanent level; (ii) hours react little on impact before displaying a hump-shaped response back to their initial value; (iii) real wages hardly react on impact and converge only very slowly to their new permanent level; (iv) in ‡ation and nominal wage growth both drop sharply on impact before slowly returning towards their initial rate. While the reaction of hours to the technology shock is a topic of much controversy, the sharp drop in in ‡ation 18 The con…dence intervals were computed by bootstrap simulation. See ACEL (2004) for details. The appendix contains the IRFs for other prominent macro aggregates that can be computed from the VAR. 19 Romer and Romer (2004) employ a di¤erent identi…cation scheme based on internal Fed documents. Interestingly, they …nd that the response of in ‡ation to a monetary shock is even more delayed but that the humpshape is signi…cant. 20 Studies documenting a small inverse response of real wages to a monetary shock include Gamber and Joutz (1997) and Fleischman (1999 For the investment-speci…c technology shock …nally, both output and hours increase on impact but the con…dence intervals are close to zero. In ‡ation reacts positively but insigni…cantly and real wages again move sluggishly to their new permanent level.
In sum, the striking observation from ACEL's VAR is the sluggish response of real wages, irrespective of the type of shock, and the very distinct reaction of in ‡ation and nominal wage growth with respect to monetary vs. neutral technology shocks.
Estimation results
We partition the parameters of our model into three groups. The …rst group consists of model parameters that we calibrate such as to match salient long-run characteristics of the data. Specif- The second group consists of the model parameters ' 2 ; ' 3 ; ; !; ; b; ; & that we estimate. As discussed in the previous section, the model dynamics only depend on the ratios ' 1 =' 3 and ' 2 =' 3 and balanced growth imposes 1 = ' 1 + ' 2 + ' 3 . We thus estimate only ' 2 and ' 3 . For pricing, there is a direct correspondence between the NKPC slope parameter and the probability of price reoptimization 1 p . We thus estimate directly. For capital utilization, the only parameter that matter is the steady state elasticity of 0 with respect to U ; i.e. = @ 00 (U )U= 0 (U ) (see the appendix). For = 0, capital utilization becomes in…nitely variable whereas for ! 1, capital utilization is constant. Finally, we refrain from estimating the parameter v and set it to v = 0;
this is the case where workers do not take into account the productive situation of the …rm when evaluating their gift. As it turns out, v = 0 is a global optimum. For space reasons, we refer the reader to the appendix for the alternative case where v = 1.
The third group of parameters pertains to the exogenous shock processes. These parameters,
, are also estimated. 24 The …rst two columns of Table 1 (attached at the end of the paper) display the point estimates and standard errors for the second and third group of parameters. The small, yet signi…cant estimate of ' 2 indicates that external employment conditions play only a minor role for wage setting. The coe¢ cient on wage-entitlement, by contrast, is more than eight times larger (i.e. The estimated relative weights of wage entitlement and rent sharing in the worker's reference accords with the …nding of survey studies on reciprocity. As Bewley (1999) and others report, 24 Note that we do not estimate the persistence parameter on money growth,
M
. In all estimations, this parameter was consistently estimated at its lower bound zero. We thus simply set hand, emphasize that the …rm's ability to pay and the extent to which the rent is being shared are also important dimensions along which workers assess a wage o¤er. 25 Our estimates for ' 1 =' 3 and ' 2 =' 3 can be viewed as the macroeconomic counterpart of the available micro evidence, notably comforting the small purported role of external employment conditions.
The estimates of the other structural parameters of the model are similar to those reported in ACEL (2004). We therefore refer to their paper for a general discussion. Three parameter estimates deserve special attention, however. First, the coe¢ cient on the real marginal cost in the NKPC is estimated at^ = 0:040. This implies an average price duration of about 5.5 quarters under the frictionless capital markets assumption entertained here. As ACEL (2004) show, however, the same slope estimate implies a price duration of only 1.5 quarters if capital is assumed to be …rm-speci…c. Second, the price indexation estimate of! p = 1 is at its upper bound and implies that non-reoptimizing …rms update their prices with lagged in ‡ation. The NKPC therefore implies that in ‡ation depends equally on expected future and lagged in ‡ation. 26 This feature turns out to be important to match the dynamic response of in ‡ation to a monetary shock and we return to the e¤ects of this parameter further below. Third, the interest semi-elasticity of money & = 2:603 is relatively close to the corresponding estimate of 4 0:80 = 3:2 reported in ACEL notwithstanding the fact that their money demand block is more complex than ours. 27 Considering …nally the third group of parameters, we …rst remark that the neutral technology growth is estimated to be very persistent but that the innovation standard deviation is less than half that obtained by ACEL (2004) . The persistence and volatility of the investment-speci…c technology shock are very similar to the estimates reported in ACEL. In line with ACEL, we also …nd that the volatility of monetary innovations is about one-third. Our estimates for the parameters de…ning the 25 See Bewley (2002) or the appendix of Danthine and Kurmann (2007) for a discussion of this evidence. 26 We do not report standard errors here as they would not be very meaningful since this estimate is at its upper bound. 27 ACEL (2004) 28 For the investment-speci…c technology shock, our estimate of^ The estimated model fares less well with respect to the neutral technology shock. While the model is again successful in generating the sluggish real wage reaction, the responses of both output and hours are too small on impact (although they converge to their empirical long-run levels).
This shortcoming is due to a combination of a small (estimated) standard deviation of the neutral technology shock innovation together with a small accommodation coe¢ cient in the money growth rule. Note also that there is considerable uncertainty as to the exact dynamics of output and 28 We also examine the robustness of our results to an interest rate rule of the form
where Y is the potential output level that would obtain in a world without nominal frictions. In this case, money demand is irrelevant for the dynamics of the model. Interestingly, our results are robust to this change. See the appendix for details.
hours conditional on a neutral technology shock (see the discussion above). Hence, in a di¤erently speci…ed VAR, our model might be right on target with respect to these two variables.
A more important shortfall of the estimated model is the small response on impact of in ‡ation and nominal wage growth in response to the neutral technology shock. According to the VAR, both these variables experience a large and signi…cant drop over the …rst few periods after the neutral technology shock. The major reason for this failure is the estimated in ‡ation indexation coe¢ cient (! p = 1) that makes in ‡ation dynamics depend on past in ‡ation. This estimate helps generate the sluggish, hump-shaped response of in ‡ation to a monetary policy shock but at the same time prevents in ‡ation from falling sharply on impact. Given the sluggish adjustment of real wages, this means in turn that nominal wage growth does not react much. By the same token, if in ‡ation dropped markedly, nominal wage growth would also fall, in line with the evidence. In Section 6, we revisit the dynamics of prices and wages and show that setting ! p = 0 resolves much of the problem.
The role of external employment conditions, rent-sharing and wage entitlement
To illustrate the role of external employment conditions for wage setting, we set ' 2 = 0:9 and, consequently, ' 1 = ' 3 = 0:05 in order to respect the balanced growth restriction of Proposition 3 (with all the other parameters kept unchanged). This corresponds to a situation where the importance of external employment conditions relative to wage entitlement is increased by a factor of about 150. Figure 3 displays the results.
Real wages, in ‡ation and nominal wage growth become considerably more sensitive to monetary policy and investment-speci…c technology shocks. In fact, the responses of in ‡ation and nominal wage growth remain hump-shaped only because of the other real rigidities and the in ‡ation indexing feature of the model. Furthermore, the model loses a substantial part of its internal ampli…cation.
The sensitivity of real wages and in ‡ation when external labor market conditions play a more prominent role is consistent with the partial equilibrium analysis of the previous section. Faced with a monetary or an investment-speci…c shock, …rms increase labor input. This pushes up the reference compensation level and …rms …nd it optimal to increase wages and consequently prices. of the fair wage hypothesis that explains why these models fail to generate sluggish real wage adjustment and internal ampli…cation. Our results con…rm this conclusion and suggest, in addition, that models emphasizing …rm-internal (or local labor market) conditions rather than aggregate labor conditions have the potential to replicate the dynamics of important macro aggregates.
The second sensitivity check is with respect to the relative importance of rent-sharing and wage entitlement. In particular, we set ' 1 = 0:01 and ' 3 = 1 0:01 ' 2 = 0:918. This corresponds to a situation with wage entitlement only. Then, we set ' 1 = 0:918 and ' 3 = 1 0:918 ' 2 = 0:01, which corresponds to a situation with rent-sharing only. In both cases we keep all other parameters unchanged. Figure 4 displays the results.
In line with the partial equilibrium analysis of Section 4, more weight on rent-sharing dampens, or even changes the direction of the response of real wages to monetary policy and investmentspeci…c shocks. As a result, marginal cost reacts to a lesser extent, which in turn generates a smoother, dampened response of in ‡ation. More weight on wage entitlement has the opposite e¤ect on wages and in ‡ation with respect to monetary and investment-speci…c technology shocks.
With respect to neutral technology shocks, more weight on wage entitlement makes real wages less reactive while generating a larger drop in in ‡ation and thus nominal wage growth (the reaction on impact of the two variables remains small because of in ‡ation indexing). These results explain why the estimation attributes such an important role to wage entitlement but why, at the same time, rent-sharing remains a crucial ingredient for the model to match the dynamics of real wages and in ‡ation.
6 Nominal wage rigidity 
Nominal wage contracts
The assumptions underlying the nominal wage contracts model are identical to those in ACEL (2004). We therefore limit the description of the model to a strict minimum and refer the reader to these authors for details. There is a continuum of households h 2 [0; 1] with preferences given by
where C t+j denotes the household's consumption and N h;t+j hours worked. 29 Working hours supplied by households (indexed h) constitute a di¤erentiated input that …rms combine into a composite labor factor N t according to
where 1 w < 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across N h;t+j . Firms take the nominal wage of each household's labor as given and adjust demand so as to minimize the cost of labor.
The resulting demand for household h's hours is given by
where W n h;t is the nominal wage charged by household h and W n t is the aggregate nominal wage of the composite labor factor. The speci…cation of the nominal wage contract follows Calvo (1983) and is similar to the adjustment mechanism for intermediate goods …rms'prices spelled out in Section 3. In each period, a given household may reoptimize its nominal wage with probability w . This probability is constant over the business cycle and independent of the household's wage setting history. With probability 1 w , households cannot reoptimize and instead adjust their nominal wage according to 29 Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Woodford (1996) show that consumption levels and asset holdings across households are identical provided there exists a complete set of state-contingent securities. We follow ACEL (2004) and adopt this hypothesis thus bypassing heterogeneity issues.
where C A (1 )= V is the steady state growth rate of consumption. The household's optimization problem thus consists of maximizing (24) subject to its budget constraint (which is identical to the corresponding constraint in Section 3), the …rm's labor demand (26) and the nominal wage adjustment constraint described above.
The implicit assumption behind this nominal wage contracting scheme is that households supply any quantity of labor demanded at their posted wage. Barro (1977) and Hall (1980) were highly critical of this hypothesis during an earlier period of research on this type of model. Indeed the allocative role of nominal wages thus postulated implies potentially important ine¢ ciencies as households are consistently pushed o¤ their labor supply schedule.
Empirical performance
As before, we calibrate a number of parameters to …t salient long-run facts. The remaining parameters are estimated. 30 The …rst two columns of Table 2 report the point estimates and standard errors. The estimates are similar to those reported in ACEL (2004). In particular, we estimate an average wage contract duration of 1=(1 ^ w ) = 3:1 quarters, slightly below the 3:6 quarters estimated by ACEL. Also note that the estimation results in both prices and wages being completely indexed to past in ‡ation (i.e.! p =! w = 1). 31 The largest di¤erences occur with respect to the estimates of the exogenous shock processes. These di¤erences are not surprising given that we specify a somewhat alternative transmission mechanism for monetary policy.
The estimates of the marginal cost coe¢ cient in the NKPC and the in ‡ation indexation parameter are very similar to the baseline estimates obtained for the reciprocity model in the …rst column of shock is estimated to be very persistent but subject to small innovations, the same process in the nominal wage contracts model is only moderately persistent but subject to innovations that are on average about 5 times larger. Furthermore, the accommodation coe¢ cient in the money growth rule is estimated to be roughly four times larger in the wage contracts model than in the reciprocity model, meaning that monetary policy allows technology shocks to have much larger short term real e¤ects. The general equilibrium e¤ect of these di¤erences in estimates for the IRFs with respect to a neutral technology shock are di¢ cult to gauge analytically (since a larger persistence parameter A increases the unconditional volatility of the actual shock A ). We therefore perform some numerical comparisons that are discussed at the end of this section. Table 1 and 849.53 in Table 2 indicate, the overall …t of the two models over all IRFs is almost identical. 32 The endogenous nominal wage rigidity in the reciprocity model is enhanced, of course, by the estimated in ‡ation indexation by non-reoptimizing …rms. As we see below, however, even when we set in ‡ation indexation to zero, the reciprocity model still manages to generate a substantial amount of endogenous nominal wage rigidity in the case of monetary and investment-speci…c technology shocks. This indicates that our reciprocity-based mechanism of wage setting provides a stronger internal ampli…cation mechanism for the neutral technology shocks than the wage contracts model. This is noteworthy because DSGE models are often criticized for their reliance on implausibly large technology shocks. The estimates for the wage contracts model, by contrast, change quite dramatically and become considerably less plausible. In particular, the average wage contract duration increases to 1=(1 ^ w ) = 6:4 quarters, which is substantially above the reported micro-evidence (e.g. Taylor, 1998); capital utilization becomes constant ( ! 1) and investment adjustment costs become very large.
The response of prices and wages revisited
Hence, the restriction of ! p = 0 seems to have important e¤ects and requires implausible estimates for the wage contracts model to …t the VAR evidence. Figure 6 illustrates the empirical performance of the two reestimated models. Unsurprisingly, both models now have in ‡ation jump up on impact of the monetary shock. However, this jump is relatively modest and the IRFs are back within the con…dence bands after 2 periods. Both models also generate a fall in in ‡ation after a neutral technology shock that is just within the con…dence bounds of the VAR. Hence, as long as we impose ! p = 0, the reciprocity model generates acceptable in ‡ation dynamics without implying implausible estimates. 34 See Gali and Gertler (1999) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we incorporate a reciprocity-based model of wage determination into a modern DSGE framework. We estimate the structural parameters of the model and assess its ability to generate the distinct dynamics of prominent macroeconomic aggregates in response to various exogenous shocks. Several results stand out. First, our estimation suggests that workers'past wage level (a factor we associate with a sense of wage entitlement) but also …rms'ability to pay (resulting from rent-sharing considerations) are the most important determinants of wage setting. Aggregate labor market conditions -the wage reference typically emphasized in standard e¢ ciency wage formulations 35 One may expect that nominal wage growth in the wage contracts model is prevented from falling on impact of the neutral technology shock because of the estimated backward-looking wage setting behavior (i.e.! w = 1). However, when we reestimate the wage contracts model with ! w = 0, nominal wage growth jumps up on impact of a neutral technology shock, thus rendering the model even more inconsistent with the VAR evidence. See the appendix for details.
-are estimated to be of minor importance. These …ndings accord well with a large number of survey studies on reciprocity in labor relations and wage setting in general. The reason often given in these studies for the relative unimportance of …rm-external labor market conditions is that individuals have only little knowledge of the market value of their work and thus resort to alternative reference points. While our model stops short from formalizing this information problem, we …nd the match between our estimates of the determinants of wage setting and the survey evidence intriguing and suggestive of interesting avenues for future research.
The second important result is that the proposed reciprocity-based wage setting model is capable of …tting the empirical VAR dynamics at least as well as a model postulating nominal wage contracts. In particular, the estimated reciprocity model implies substantial structural rigidity in real wages that is manifest across the various types of shock hitting the economy. This is consistent with the presented VAR evidence. Nominal wage contracts, on the other hand, imply a form of rigidity that makes it hard to replicate the immediate, large response of nominal wage growth to a neutral technology shock. In addition, as argued by Barro (1977) and Hall (1980) , the allocative role of nominal wage contracts implies potentially important ine¢ ciencies if one assumes that the underlying labor supply schedule is neoclassical. The reciprocity-based wage setting mechanism is based on a very di¤erent view of the labor market, one where …rms set wages so as to elicit optimal e¤ort. It is, by construction, not subject to the Barro-Hall critique. Our analysis suggests that, in a low in ‡ation environment, nominal wages often remain unchanged for several quarters because …rms …nd it optimal to keep real wage adjustments relatively small rather than because recontracting is expensive.
Why should we be concerned about the nature of wage setting in DSGE models? One important reason is normative. Blanchard and Gali (2006) show, for example, that the optimal monetary policy implications of a model with nominal wage contracts di¤er substantially from those of a reducedform model of real wage rigidity. Our reciprocity model takes this argument one step further by providing an explicit, utility-based, theory for why past wages matter in wage setting. Likewise, our analysis of optimal …rm behavior suggests possible externalities stemming from rent-sharing considerations. These structural modeling features result in potentially relevant trade-o¤s between in ‡ation and output that should be taken into account when formulating monetary policy. Nominal Wage Growth
